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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the association between geographic diversification and Spanish savings 
bank (caja) failure. The paper focuses on the geographic expansion of cajas between 2002 and 
2012 and failure of several cajas between 2008 and 2011 during the Spanish banking crisis. 
Employing financial statement and branch location data collected from the CECA, logit models 
were used to test the association between failure and geographic and cultural diversification. This 
paper finds that, depending on the model estimated, geographic and cultural diversification of 
cajas either reduced or had no effect on the odds ratio of failure, suggesting that the benefits of 
asset diversification outweigh the costs and risks associated with entering unfamiliar markets and 
overcoming linguistic and cultural barriers. Thus, there is evidence that cajas may benefit from 
expanding geographically and into diverse cultural regions. Regulators should not discourage 
geographic diversification.  
 
1. Introduction 
 The recent Spanish financial crisis resulted from the bursting of a real estate bubble that 
appeared as a result of high housing demand. However, the underlying cause of the crisis appears 
to be the cajas de ahorros. These Spanish savings banks experienced the highest numbers of loan 
defaults and were the main financial institutions requiring bailout funds throughout the crisis. We 
examine whether the cajas’ geographic expansion, which started after the fall of the Francisco 
Franco regime in 1975 and rapidly intensified after Spain joined the EU in 1999, increased risk 
throughout the Spanish financial system. In particular, we examine whether this geographic 
expansion is associated with increased failure of cajas.  
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The Spanish Banking Crisis 
 Under the Franco regime, Spain was closed to international trade and investment. After 
the fall of the Franco regime in 1975, the Spanish economy slowly began integrating into 
European markets. Decrees in the late 1970s allowed foreign banks to enter the market. Although 
these banks held a very low market share, they significantly impacted the development of the 
Spanish financial system (Berges, Ontiveros, & Valero, 2012). However, full integration of both 
foreign banks in Spain and Spanish markets with the rest of Europe did not occur until Spain 
joined the European Union in 1999. Once integrated with the European Union, Spain’s economy 
boomed, greatly impacting its real estate market.  
By the end of 2006, Spain had experienced a massive property boom paid for with private 
debt (Reuters, 2006). In 2007 household debt swelled to 120% of disposable income. Roughly 
95% of Spanish mortgages were variable-rate, resulting in ever-increasing payments for 
homeowners (Johnson & Bjork, 2007). Then, at the end of 2008, the Spanish economy officially 
entered a recession. To combat it, Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and the central 
government approved and implemented a stimulus package valued at €8 billion (The Telegraph, 
2012). The need for bailout funds continued throughout the year and Spain created a state-
backed bank restructuring fund known as the Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring (FROB). The 
fund, which still exists, was designed to provide approximately €99 billion to 45 Spanish cajas to 
help eliminate “…excess capacity in the banking system and make them more efficient” by 
reducing the number of cajas to 15 (The Telegraph, 2012). 
Although the country exited recession in during the first quarter of 2010, the ripples of 
the banking crisis continued during the following year. By this point, bond yields had risen 
sharply, affecting not only Spain but other EU countries which experienced a spillover effect. 
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The European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Union began 
discussions with Spain regarding the economic conditions within the country. At the end of 
2011, unemployment reached 22.8% and Spain fell back into recession by the beginning of 2012. 
A deeply troubled Bankia, created through a merger between CajaMadrid and six smaller cajas 
sought bailout funds equaling €9 billion in 2012 as the economic conditions in Spain worsened, 
the 10-year government bond yield reached 6.81%, the German 10-year yield peaked at 
approximately 2% that same year, and Spain ended the year seeking funding from the Eurozone 
to help “shore-up” its failing banks (The Telegraph, 2012). Spain received funds from the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) set up by the Eurozone. When Spain’s ESM assistance 
program expired at the end of 2013, the country had received a total of €41.3 billion (ESM, 
2014).   
Cajas de Ahorros 
 Cajas de ahorros, “boxes of savings”, first emerged in 1835 to help promote savings in 
the Spanish communities. Until the passage of the 1880 Ley de Cajas de Ahorros (Law of Cajas 
de Ahorros), cajas were regulated and developed by the central government, which at the time 
was controlled by a monarch and parliament. Prior to the 1880 law, cajas were required to 
operate jointly with montes de piedad, which were basically charitable pawnbrokers. Many cajas 
took advantage of the new-found organizational freedom and opened new branches (Comín, 
2012b). However, the cajas lost much of their operational freedom in 1939 when Francisco 
Franco took control of the country after the Civil War. The dictatorship required cajas to provide 
funding for what it called “social-welfare projects.” Furthermore, Franco and the Spanish 
national government created a huge deficit that was largely financed by the cajas. This continued 
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until Franco’s death in 1975 and the cajas became regulated by the Bank of Spain (Comín, 
2012b). 
In 1977, the cajas became equal in operations to Spanish commercial banks, allowing the 
cajas to make their own financial decisions free of government interference. The period 
following the 1977 legislation was marked by increased caja diversification and the geographic 
expansion of cajas to other regions (Comín, 2012b). We investigate whether the recent economic 
crisis resulted in part from the risk associated with this territorial expansion.  
Geographic Diversification 
 Geographic diversification is normally associated with decreased risk, although there is 
some debate as to the extent of the risk reduction benefits. Modern portfolio theory (Markowitz, 
1959) suggests that diversification of assets typically reduces volatility of earnings and will 
likely boost capital gains. Moreover, geographic diversification allows small-sized banks to 
protect against both idiosyncratic and local market risk because such banks are severely 
impacted by local economic changes and individual loan defaults (Emmons, Gilbert, & Yeager, 
2004). As a result of low or even negative correlations between different regions or countries, 
banks may see increased profit efficiencies from opening new branches (Berger, de Young, & 
Udell, 2001). Therefore, geographic diversification outside of a bank’s original regions should 
lead to less volatile and even increased earnings.  
 However, several components of geographic diversification may negate these benefits 
(Deng & Elyasiani, 2008). Some regulatory measures are linked to the riskiness of a bank’s 
portfolio. Therefore, banks are encouraged by regulators to expand beyond what is efficient 
(Hayden, Porath, & von Westernhagen, 2007). Furthermore, regulators are more likely to 
provide bailouts funds when more than one bank fails at any given time. This boosts the banks’ 
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incentive to diversify beyond their optimal levels (Wagner, 2010). Also, as banks expand 
geographically, management capabilities and operational efficiencies severely decline (Emmons, 
Gilbert and Yeager 2004; Berger, DeYong and Udell 2001; Buch, Driscoll and Ostergaard 2010).  
 Since there is still debate on whether or not geographic diversification improves or hurts 
banks, our research aims to clarify the relationship. The geographic diversification of cajas has 
yet to be studied. Our research will shed light on geographic diversification in an internationally 
integrated market. Spanish cajas are regulated by both the Bank of Spain and the European 
Central Bank. Thus, our research will introduce new regulatory environments as well as use an 
underrepresented sample to clarify the debate.    
We tested the association between increased geographic diversification and a higher 
probability of caja failure and the association between higher levels of cultural diversification 
and a higher probability of caja failure. Geographic diversification, in two models, is associated 
with a decreased in the odds of caja failure and is not significant in any other models. Thus, an in 
geographic diversification by one kilometer is associated with a 0.05% change in the odds ratio 
and a 0.011% decrease in the odds ratio (Table 4).  Similarly, increasing cultural diversification 
by one percentage point is associated with a 0.872% decrease in the odds ratio at the 5% level of 
significance. The coefficients on CULTURE in all other models are insignificant.  Several other 
patterns emerged throughout the models. Increasing capital as a percentage of total assets is 
associated with a decline of approximately 0.22% in the odds of failure in three models and is 
insignificant in all other models. Unexpectedly, increasing the total assets by 1% from one year 
to the next reduces the odds ratio by 0.043% or more in Models 1-5 and 7 (Table 3, and Table 5). 
Lastly, a caja headquartered in Galicia has a 111% higher odds of failure relative to all other 
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regions (Table 4). The remaining control variables (ROA and other regional variables) were not 
significant in any model.  
As a result of the crisis and major caja failure between 2008 and 2010, we narrowed the 
data set to specifically focus on this time period. As seen in most models, neither geographic nor 
cultural diversification is significant in this model. However, increasing the percent change in 
total assets by 1% is associated with a 0.042% decrease in the odds ratio (Table 5).  Also an 
increase of 1% in the fixed income ratio is associated with a 24.9% increase in the odds ratio 
(Table 5).  
Therefore, the models indicate that geographic and cultural diversification either decrease 
or do not impact the odds of failure. Regulators should not discourage caja expansion into new 
territories while promoting increases in total assets to prevent failure.  
This paper intends to investigate the association between geographic diversification and 
caja failure. We begin first with a brief history of caja development and the appearance of the 
real estate bubble. We then put forth the current academic discussion of geographic 
diversification and its association with risk. This will be followed by a discussion of our data and 
summary statistics. Lastly, we construct econometric models to test our hypotheses and present 
the results.  
2. Development of the Cajas and the Real Estate Bubble 
Cajas de ahorros first emerged as entities supporting charitable acts and promoting 
savings within their communities under the passage of legislation in 1835. The main objective of 
these organizations was to motivate the lower classes to begin saving while providing loans to 
the “neediest segments of the population”, meaning those under-served by traditional banks. 
During this time the national government regulated the cajas and developed the guidelines their 
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governing bodies were to follow (Comín, 2012b). After the 1880 Ley de Cajas de Ahorros, the 
cajas became more independent from the national government since the cajas no longer needed 
to follow rigid guidelines but rather a basic operational outline (Comín, 2012b).   
The Civil War, which broke out in 1936, reduced the savings banks’ share of the 
country’s deposits significantly, most likely due to strong ties between the cajas and the existing 
parliamentary government. In 1939, the Franco regime came to power and demanded that the 
cajas provide loans for so-called “social welfare” projects, draining savings banks’ capital in the 
process. These endeavors included education and healthcare projects as well as loans to farmers 
and businesses aligned with the Ministry of Finance or other parts of the government (Comín, 
2012b). Rather than choosing their social and welfare activities, cajas transferred money to the 
Ministry of Labor or funded projects that were mandated directly by the government. From 1947 
to 1957 alone, the share of net income cajas were required to put towards “National Social 
Work” grew from 20% to 33% (Comín, 2012b). The majority of the savings banks’ profits went 
into deposit-insurance style reserve funds, representing a type of “guarantee” to depositors.  
 In addition, the Franco government used the cajas to help reduce a national deficit of 
approximately 1.5% it had generated during its early years in power (Comín, 2012a). Around 
1951, a decree from the Ministry of Finance required them to devote a minimum of “60% of 
their borrowings to the purchase of public funds” (Comín, 2012b).  The cajas were fully 
incorporated into the Ministry of Finance after reforms to that agency took effect in 1957. 
Spanish savings thus began to be regulated by the Ministry of Finance at this time and were used 
as vehicles of economic policy, supporting public and government-aligned private firm 
financing. These private companies were selected because the government received “privileged 
credit” on which interest was below the market rate (Comín, 2012b). This continued until the 
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1970s, when Franco died and the Spanish monarchy, headed by Prince Juan Carlos, was 
reinstated, which initiated a push towards democracy in Spain.  
In 1971, during the waning years of the Franco government, the Bank of Spain began 
regulating cajas, leveling the playing field across the financial sector. Before this time, the Bank 
of Spain only regulated the commercial banks. Under the new regulation a “…de-specialization 
of institutions and a reduction in their mandatory investments” occurred (Comín, 2012b). Home 
loans represented a large portion of the cajas’ lending. Cajas provided 57.4% of the funding for 
home purchases in 1976, although the cajas continued supporting healthcare, cultural activities 
and education (Comín, 2012b). The true turning point came in 1977, when the democratic 
Decree 2290/1977 passed, declaring that Spanish savings banks were equal to commercial banks 
in all aspects, including the ability to diversify operations and freely make financial decisions. 
This signaled the start of the expansion and diversification of cajas. Almost immediately, cajas 
started opening branches throughout Spain as a way to diversify their balance sheets (Comín, 
2012b).  
In 1978 foreign banks were allowed to enter the Spanish market (Marín Hernández & 
Bernabé Pérez, 2005). Competition increased as a result of Spain’s financial internationalization. 
Innovative products that Spain had little knowledge of or experience with entered the markets in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s as foreign banks brought their home-country practices with them. 
These included variable-rate mortgages and savings accounts that paid relative high interest rates 
(Berges, Ontiveros, & Valero, 2012). 
Motivated by the accession of Spain into the European community, new regulatory 
standards were introduced in 1985. Between 1985 and 1987, the Spanish government attempted 
to prevent economic overheating (Berges, Ontiveros, & Valero, 2012). Cajas were required to 
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put aside reserve funds based on the risks levels of their accounts and loans. Spain passed other 
regulatory measures during the later 1980s and early 1990s including changing accounting 
practices for cajas (Marín Hernández & Bernabé Pérez, 2005).   
The extended period of growth culminated with a 72.66% increase in caja branch 
locations outside the cajas’ original region between 1999 and 2008 (Gutiérrez 2011, Saurina 
2012). However, by the end of 2009, 783 branches closed, 59.4% of them located in areas in 
which the territorial expansion occurred (Gutiérrez Fernández, Palomo Zurdo, & Romero 
Cuadrado, 2011). It can be argued that the geographical expansion Spanish savings banks 
underwent should have reduced risk through the diversification of local economic conditions and 
clientele. But even with branches throughout the country, the cajas suffered substantial losses 
when the financial crisis unfolded.  
There are indications that the financial crisis resulted largely because of a property 
bubble created by large increases in construction projects. Land reforms under the Ley del Suelo 
(Land Law) in the late 1990s and early 2000s allowed for more centralized planning, in terms of 
construction projects, that led to the development of the housing bubble (Jesús Güemes, 2011). 
Both the national and local governments under the passage of these rules could urbanize. More 
specifically, in 2001 Prime Minister José María Aznar and his government re-defined the soil 
and land classifications in way that increased the amount of developable land on the market, 
further promoting construction (Agencia Estatal Boletín Oficial del Estado, 1998).  
Construction and its share of national economic production influenced the cajas’ 
movement to new regions. As less-skilled workers immigrated to Spain and construction jobs 
were created in suburbanizing rural areas, the cajas moved into those regions, looking for new 
depositors and borrowers. Increasing population density of a particular region was associated 
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with the entry of cajas into that area, supporting the claim that expansion focused on raising 
more capital and expanding operations (Gutiérrez Fernández, Palomo Zurdo, & Romero 
Cuadrado, 2011).  
Certain areas of Spain, including Madrid, Barcelona, Murcia, Castellón, Valencia, 
Almería, and Cataluña, experienced enormous influxes of construction projects that brought 
numerous workers to these areas. These new projects increased salaries in the regions and 
disproportionately boosted the demand for homes and mortgages (Campos Echeverría, 2008). In 
Madrid, for example, the median salary exceeded that of the Extremadura region in western 
Spain by 47% in 2006, while the home purchase price in the same year was 210% more than in 
Extremadura (Campos Echeverría, 2008). Clearly, the higher salary level in Madrid indicates the 
ability to purchase a higher-value home, but the increase in housing prices far exceeded the 
increase in salaries. This resulted in a large dispersion of purchasing power throughout the 
various regions of Spain (Campos Echeverría, 2008). An interested individual was unlikely to 
afford a home that jumped in price by 210% when his or her yearly salary rose by only 47%. 
Moreover, prices in Madrid and other city areas caused many recent migrants to those cities to 
return home or move to regions with lower prices. It is this movement of people that seemed to 
lead to lower home demand in more populated regions and the shift in cajas’ branches to more 
remote regions of Spain (Campos Echeverría, 2008).  
While the political dynamics in Spain played an important role in the development of the 
property bubble and crisis, a full analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the debate 
surrounding the crisis’ origins and the impact policy played on the severity of it is worth noting. 
Some argue that the financial sector fell victim to problems created in other parts of the Spanish 
economy primarily because cajas were still responsible for full payment of covered bonds. These 
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instruments are used to finance housing loans; thus, are backed by mortgages. However, the 
strict regulation on covered bonds created no incentive for cajas to provide mortgages to those 
unable to pay them (The Pain in Spain, 2008). This indicates that the loan defaults experienced 
by cajas were largely related to another factor in the economy.  
Construction and its effects appear to be the key player in the financial crisis. When 
projects throughout the country stopped, consumption declined while unemployment rose. With 
workers unable to pay back their mortgages, the Spanish cajas absorbed the delinquencies. 
Moreover, the low level of consumption brought the economy to a halt (Tremlett, 2009). To 
prevent further collapse, the government sought external funding. However, the government 
received very little assistance because of conditions both within and outside the country. Prime 
Minister Rodríguez Zapatero blamed the international credit crunch, which started in 2008, for 
the worsening conditions in Spain. In doing so, the government ignored the large amounts of 
debt builders owed to cajas (Tremlett, 2009).  
Meanwhile, unemployment continued to rise throughout the country causing GDP to 
decline as consumption dissipated (Murado, 2012). The governments of Prime Ministers 
Rodríguez Zapatero and Mariano Rajoy had limited mobility in terms of their response to the 
looming problems because of Spain’s EU membership. For example, a devaluation of the 
currency, which would improve the country’s competitiveness and boost exports, was not an 
option because the devaluation would spread to other EU nations (The Pain in Spain, 2008). 
Thus, another method to prevent total economic failure was needed in Spain.  
In 2011, as the government transitioned from Prime Minister Rodríguez Zapatero to the 
government of newly-elected Prime Minister Rajoy, the emphasis shifted to tax breaks. Rajoy 
faced serious problems since the target deficit negotiated between Rodríguez Zapatero and the 
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EU was set at 4.4% for the year. In order to meet such a level, Rajoy would either need to 
implement higher tax policies or cut government spending by nearly €17bn (Tremlett, 2011). It 
appears as if the government initially focused on cutting spending throughout the country. Thus, 
they ignored the main catalyst for the crisis: large amounts of unemployed construction workers 
and loans held by builders.  
3. Theory and Literature Review  
  Portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1959) concludes that asset diversification in many cases 
boosts capital gains, lowers volatility of earnings, and decreases risk. It follows that geographic 
diversification of bank portfolios will lead to reduced risk, increased capital gains, and increased 
revenues for banks. Normally, geographic diversification allows a bank to reduce its 
idiosyncratic and local market risk. Moreover, low correlations between loan returns may boost 
profit efficiency. Yet the benefits of geographic diversification may come with downside risks. 
During territorial expansion, cultural and linguistic barriers may make it difficult for banks 
operating in new regions to make prudent lending and operational decisions. Management 
therefore must overcome cultural, language, and regulatory differences to boost profits and 
reduce risk. Lastly, some regulatory practices are set up in such a way that banks benefit from 
diversifying both their portfolios and geographic locations beyond optimal levels.  
Small-sized banks generally concentrate lending in one geographic region, boosting the 
banks’ ability to monitor borrowers closely and build long-standing relationships in which the 
lender understands the borrowers’ history. However, the banks may then experience both 
idiosyncratic and local market risk since individual loan defaults and local economic changes 
will have an outsized impact on the bank’s portfolio (Emmons, Gilbert, & Yeager, 2004). It is 
therefore not surprising that small banks may desire to expand geographically in order to 
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diversify their portfolios in search of lower earnings volatilities. Geographic expansion may 
improve profit efficiency because of the low or even negative correlations between loans and 
securities in different regions or countries (Berger, de Young, & Udell, 2001). Diversification 
across regions may also help banks achieve economies of scale, because expansion will come at 
a lower cost after the initial investment into infrastructure is made (Berger, Hasan, & Zhou, 
2010). Expanding not just from region to region but to other countries will reduce market risk, 
especially when the correlation between two countries’ economic performance is low.  
Wagner (2010) presents a theory that shows, ironically, how diversification within banks 
can lead to strong similarities among banks and, hence, greater systemic risk. Because the market 
or regulator may dictate the types of assets held in a portfolio or the types of loans dispersed, 
banks will begin investing in similar assets or loans, causing increased correlations between 
firms. Markets made up of these similar institutions have greater probabilities of systemic crises, 
meaning the costs truly outweigh the benefits (Wagner, 2010).  
As banks spread across geographical lines, profitability may also decline as management 
fights to overcome the costs and risks incurred with such expansions. When small banks open 
branches across wide geographical areas, the operational inefficiencies and management 
challenges created may outweigh the small decrease in local market risk (Emmons, Gilbert, & 
Yeager, 2004). The management of these banks, particularly those intending to expand to new 
countries, face challenges that include the inability to monitor from a distance; differences in 
culture, language, currency, and regulatory structure; and rules meant to deter foreign 
competitors (Berger, de Young, & Udell, 2001). Another important challenge for banks 
expanding geographically is to develop the trust of the residents of the new country or region. 
Managers influence employee’s performances, which in turn influence customers’ perceptions of 
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the bank. Poor management may therefore indirectly cause residents of a new market to lose trust 
in a bank (Buch, Driscoll, & Ostergaard, 2010).  
Although it appears to have little impact in Spain, other literature notes that regulatory 
incentives, including capital requirements or dynamic provisioning, boost banks’ need to 
diversify or focus their portfolios. Under such regulations, banks attempt to alter their asset 
riskiness since these requirements are directly related to portfolio risk (Hayden, Porath, & von 
Westernhagen, 2007). Regulators are also more likely to bail out banks during joint failures 
(when two or more banks fail together), boosting the incentives for banks to diversify beyond 
optimal levels and according to regulator recommendations (Wagner, 2010). This type of 
regulatory incentive does not benefit banks that have relatively undiversified portfolios with low 
levels of downside risk. For example, specialized banks with portfolios concentrated in a single 
lending sector may exhibit lower downside risk because their staffs are able to better utilize their 
knowledge of that sector and reduce agency problems, as suggested by corporate finance theory. 
Diversification can also increase risk if banks enter sectors with relatively high downside risks 
(Hayden, Porath, & von Westernhagen, 2007).  
To summarize, the theoretical literature related to geographic diversification has 
produced mixed predictions. Portfolio theory indicates that low correlations between returns in 
different markets will benefit the expanding bank. Yet cultural and linguistic differences may 
lead banks to make riskier loans and manage operations less efficiently. Similarity among banks 
that have all diversified increases the possibility of systemic risk. Finally, regulations may 
inadvertently cause banks to engage in riskier practices.  
Turning to the empirical literature, Bos and Kolari (2005) find “net positive 
diversification benefits” in data from 1995-1999 on multibillion dollar European and American 
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banks. Similarly, Berger and de Young (2001) found that for 7,000 U.S. commercial banks from 
1993 to 1998, expanding to nearby states or regions was associated with higher efficiency levels 
and organizational control over affiliates; however this efficiency diminishes as distance of the 
branches from headquarters increases. Small banks, with less than $100 million in assets, are 
especially impacted by the distance of branches from top management. Efficient management 
tends to offset these effects, implying that proper oversight during geographic expansion is 
important.  
Stiroh (2004) investigated the impact of diversification strategies on small banks with 
less than $300 million in assets from 1984-2000 and found improved  performance as measured 
by higher returns and lower return volatility for only the largest of those banks. The smallest 
banks had no change in risk, and in some cases their risk increased. Stiroh concludes that as a 
bank expands operations to diversify revenue, the bank’s comparative advantage in local 
knowledge and relationship lending declines, and the bank may struggle to compete. These 
results indicate that it may be more beneficial for banks, in particular small banks, to specialize 
in providing services to a distinct and localized area. 
Hayden et al. (2007) found that for 983 German banks between 1996 to 2002, the impact 
of all types of diversification on banks’ returns changes according to the risk of unexpected loss. 
For instance, sectorial focus improves profitability for low-risk banks but becomes increasingly 
negative for banks with higher risk levels. Geographic diversification, however, leads to lower 
returns. Moreover, the authors found that diversification in general cuts profits in German banks 
while focusing increases profits.  
Management’s primary goal of overseeing operations as a means to increase efficiency 
and shareholder wealth may suffer as geographic distance increases as a result of unfamiliar 
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markets. In a study of 88 Chinese banks from 1996-2006, Berger, Hasan and Zhou (2010) found 
that Chinese banks suffer when managerial expertise is poor. Deng and Elyasiani (2008) 
researched the distance between branches and the bank holding company headquarters in the 
U.S. between 1994 and 2005 and found that higher distance leads to greater risk. They also noted 
that when branches are opened in remote regions that are either unknown to the holding 
company or too far away for proper oversight, mergers may increase risks  Although entering a 
foreign country normally increases a firm’s profitability, if the foreign entity begins expanding 
within the new country, it may experience reduced profits (Berger, Hasan, & Zhou, 2010). As 
noted before, entering an unfamiliar market may reduce profitability because management may 
lack proper techniques to combat the negative costs of geographic diversification. It is therefore 
crucial that the merging firms have experience in the geographic locations they enter.  
Efficiencies may decrease when moving across domestic borders because language, 
culture, and regulatory structures may vary between states or provinces (Berger & de Young, 
2001). In particular, in their study of the effects of geographic expansion on bank efficiency for 
7,000 US banks between 1993 and 1998, Berger and de Young find the more geographically 
diversified a bank, the more profit efficiencies diminish. Moreover, a study by Bos and Kolari 
(2005) of US and European banks between 1995 and 1999 that “…an increase of total distance 
within the banking organization of 1,000 miles would decrease profit efficiency by about 0.016% 
and vice versa for a decrease in distance”. Therefore, expanding domestically leads to lower 
efficiencies in part because of possible language, cultural, or regulatory differences.  
Emmons et al. (2004) find that geographic expansion reduces risk less than increasing 
bank size among rural banks. However, they find that urban banks actually benefit from 
diversification outside their labor market areas. An explanation of the results is that geographic 
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expansions reduce efficiencies and profits when the bank now must monitor and operate from 
afar. Staff in different locations may compete against one another, and upper level managers may 
not want to move to new locations. This will boost costs for the firm and may lead to a higher 
manager turnover rate which reduces the individualized attention on which the bank was 
founded, as Berger, de Young and Udell (2001) argue. Ideally, Emmons et al. conclude, banks 
should first look for expansion opportunities within the community or region instead of moving 
outside their markets.  
Thus, the empirical literature on geographic diversification is also inconclusive. Although 
there is evidence that for multibillion dollar banks geographic diversification increases profits, 
there is little evidence that expansion benefits smaller banks. Past research also indicates that 
management must deal with cultural differences in order to prevent increased risks.  
Since cajas range in size from small, community-based savings banks to multibillion 
dollar firms, we hope to investigate how geographic diversification impacted this wide range of 
banks. Also, since cajas began as rural banks, our research will shed light on how rural banks 
adjust in internationally integrated markets. Moreover, there are strong cultural and linguistic 
differences in Spain. Spain has four national recognized languages while the heritage of the 
Spanish people is extremely diverse.  
Hypotheses 
 Based on the theory and literature discussed in this section, we have formulated several 
hypotheses. The catalyst to the first hypothesis is geographic diversification, which appears to 
have had a large impact on the Spanish economy and, in particular, cajas. We will be testing the 
following question: (1) Does geographic diversification increase the probability of failure in a 
caja? 
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 Spain’s regions are culturally and linguistically diverse. As we have mentioned above, 
difference in culture and language may make it harder for cajas to operate efficiently. Therefore 
we will be testing the following: (2) Do cultural differences increase the possibility of failure in a 
caja? 
4. Data and Summary Statistics 
To analyze how geographic distance impacted loan types and loan risk, we collected data 
from the Confederación Española Cajas de Ahorros’ (CECA’s) year-end reports for 2002-2012. 
All cajas must register and report to the CECA, which resembles an American industry trade 
group. These reports contain information pertaining to individual cajas, including their financial 
statements, management profiles, branch locations, and loan types. We therefore defined “caja” 
as any savings bank with data in the CECA reports during our sample period. For each caja, we 
gathered financial statement data on cash, deposits, total assets, total liabilities, net income, 
retained earnings, fixed income investments, and total equity.  
Failure 
Throughout the crisis, numerous cajas closed or merged with other cajas. To measure 
failure (FAILURE) we created a dummy variable. FAILURE is equal to one the last year a caja 
operates before closing or merging with another caja; otherwise FAILURE is equal to zero.   
Geographic Distance 
 To measure geographic diversification, we estimated the weighted average distance 
between each caja’s headquarters and its branches (GEODIST). The CECA reports give the 
number of branches each caja operates in each of Spain’s 50 provinces and two autonomous 
cities. We obtained latitude and longitude coordinates for each of the 50 province’s largest cities, 
the location of the two autonomous cities, and each caja’s headquarters city. We then used the 
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Haversine formula (Appendix A: Haversine Formula) to calculate the distance between each 
branch and headquarter city. Then, a weighted average distance to branches for each caja for 
every year was calculated using the following formula1: 
∑
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 ∗ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠
53
𝑖=1
 
Distancei is the distance between the caja’s headquarters and city i and Number of Branchesi is 
the number of branches the caja operates in city i.  
Cultural Variables   
There are found major languages in Spain including Castilian Spanish, the official 
language, (74% of the population speaks this language), Catalan (17%), Galician (7%), and 
Basque (2%) (Central Intelligence Agency, 2014). To account for the cultural and linguistic 
differences between Spanish regions, a cultural diversification variable was created. To do this, 
the “home cultural region” was defined as the province in which the caja has its headquarters. 
All branch locations outside the “home cultural region” were considered “foreign” branches, 
because they were locations in which the culture and language was likely to be significantly 
different from those in the home region. We calculated the cultural diversification variable for 
each caja as the number of branches outside the home cultural region divided by the caja’s total 
number of branches.  
Control Variables 
 We computed a measure of leverage risk (CAPITAL) as a control variable that could 
influence caja insolvency. CAPITAL was calculated as the total equity as a percentage of total 
                                                 
1 Some international trade researchers, such as Nitsch (2000), estimate the remoteness of a country using the 
formula: Ri = (Ʃk[Yk/Dik])-1. Remoteness of a country is equal to the reciprocal of country k’s GDP divided by the 
distance between country i and k summed over all trading partners of country i (Nitsch 2000). However, since the 
regions of Spain are relatively connected and since the formula provides information on intra-country trading, we 
decided to measure distance as described. 
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assets (shareholder equity ratio). The lower the equity capital ratio, the more likely the caja is to 
become insolvent in the near future. We also employed the percent change in total assets from 
year to year (%CHANGE) another measure of risk. This measure will be large for cajas that 
expanded rapidly. Rapid growth could be the result of a risky growth strategy and, hence, 
associated with a greater likelihood of failure. The fixed income ratio (FIR) is the ratio of fixed 
income to total assets. Fixed income represents income from bonds and other investments with 
regular returns that are liquid and easily sold on the market. If demand for cash is high, these 
securities can be sold quickly and prevent fire-sale losses. Therefore, a higher fixed income 
should lower the probability of caja failure (Cole & Wu, 2009). Lastly, we used return on assets 
(ROA) as a measure of risk. ROA is calculated as the ratio of net income to total assets.  
Regional Variables 
Another catalyst to the crisis and the creation of the housing bubble was the increase in 
housing prices spurred by very high demand. However, the unequal increase in housing prices 
between 1987 and 2004 demonstrates that regional variation is present. Housing prices increased 
substantially during this period in Cataluña (620%), Madrid (570%), Baleares (540%), Castilla y 
León (286%), Galicia (232%), and Extremadura (218%), whereas the nationwide median 
housing growth from 1997 to 2006 was only 183.5% (Campos Echeverría, 2008). As a result of 
the crisis, housing prices dropped. These autonomous regions or communities would most likely 
have seen the largest drops in prices, whereas all other regions (the base case) would have seen 
lower price declines. The Insituto Nacional de Estadística (National Statistical Institute) 
published the January 2013 population figures indicating that Spain’s total population fell at 
47.13 million people. Approximately 46% of the Spanish population lives in the autonomous 
regions of Cataluña (16.03%), Madrid (13.78%), Baleares (2.36%), Castilla y León (5.35%), 
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Galicia (5.87%), and Extremadura (2.34%). This indicates that 21.6 million people were 
impacted by the large drops in housing prices during the financial crisis (Insituto Nacional de 
Estadística, 2013). Therefore, we created dummy variables for each of these regions.  
Summary Statistics 
 There were 436 observations for the 2002-2012 period. However, the sample used for in 
model testing included 376 observations because of lagging several control variables. Based on 
our summary statistics for the population (Table 1), it is evident that cajas suffered during the 
crisis. Approximately 74% of cajas failed. Many cajas reduced retained earnings to zero in order 
to support operations. In some cases the retained earnings fell below zero. Not surprisingly, cash 
balances ranged from zero to €11 trillion. Cash levels fell to zero for several cajas around the 
2009 to 2011 period. These cajas most likely used their extra cash to support their short-term 
liabilities, i.e. deposits to customers. During this period, loans payments most likely declined as a 
result of loan defaults. Loans represent the cajas’ primary assets. These assets and their related 
payments allow the cajas to support deposit withdrawals. Without these payments, the cajas 
resorted to using cash to pay their liabilities. It is crucial to note that the mean loan amount 
exceeded the deposits. In other words, the main liability driver exceeded the main asset class by 
nearly €1 trillion. The ratio of deposits to loans (0.91) demonstrates how loan defaults may have 
impacted the cajas. Cajas fund loans using the money received through deposits, then the 
payments they receive from those loans is used to support daily withdrawals. When loans exceed 
the amount of deposits and borrowers consistently make payments on time, the caja will not 
likely resort to cash or other easily convertible assets to support deposits. However, as the loans’ 
variable interest rates and payment amounts increased, many borrowers became delinquent. 
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Therefore, the cajas needed to use other funding to support deposits. Moreover, with borrowers 
using more funds to pay their loans, deposits decreased, resulting in less funding for loans.  
5. Econometric Model 
 In this section, we present econometric models to test the hypotheses discussed in Section 
3. We tested the models outlined below using logit estimation. Therefore, the estimated 
coefficients are the effects of the independent variables on the log odds ratio of failure. 2 We 
transform the coefficients using the exponential function to give us the effects on the odds ratio. 
All financial variables were lagged by one year since the previous year’s performance generally 
has the greatest influence on the likelihood of failure in the following year.  
 To test the possibility of a caja failing as a result of geographic diversification, we 
estimate a model that includes the standard control variables (CAPITAL, %CHANGE, FIR, 
ROA) along with GEODIST and the regional dummies: 
𝑭𝑨𝑰𝑳𝑼𝑹𝑬𝒊𝒕 =  𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑮𝑬𝑶𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑪𝑨𝑷𝑰𝑻𝑨𝑳𝒊𝒕−𝟏  +  𝜷𝟑%𝑪𝑯𝑨𝑵𝑮𝑬𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟒𝑭𝑰𝑹𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟓𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏 
+ 𝜷𝟔𝑪𝑨𝑻𝑨𝑳𝑼𝑵𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕𝑴𝑨𝑫𝑹𝑰𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟖𝑩𝑨𝑳𝑬𝑨𝑹𝑬𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟗𝑮𝑨𝑳𝑰𝑪𝑰𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎𝑬𝑿𝑻𝑹𝑬𝑴𝑨𝑫𝑼𝑹𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕−𝟏 (1) 
To test the possibility of a caja failing as a result of cultural diversification, we substitute 
the cultural diversification variable (CULTURE) for the geographical diversification variable: 
𝑭𝑨𝑰𝑳𝑼𝑹𝑬𝒊𝒕 =  𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑪𝑼𝑳𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑬𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑪𝑨𝑷𝑰𝑻𝑨𝑳𝒊𝒕−𝟏  +  𝜷𝟑%𝑪𝑯𝑨𝑵𝑮𝑬𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟒𝑭𝑰𝑹𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟓𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏 
+ 𝜷𝟔𝑪𝑨𝑻𝑨𝑳𝑼𝑵𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕𝑴𝑨𝑫𝑹𝑰𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟖𝑩𝑨𝑳𝑬𝑨𝑹𝑬𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟗𝑮𝑨𝑳𝑰𝑪𝑰𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎𝑬𝑿𝑻𝑹𝑬𝑴𝑨𝑫𝑼𝑹𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕−𝟏 (2) 
 To test the effect of both geographic diversification and cultural diversification on the 
probability of caja failure, we include both GEODIST and CULTURE in the model: 
𝑭𝑨𝑰𝑳𝑼𝑹𝑬𝒊 =  𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑮𝑬𝑶𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑪𝑼𝑳𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑬𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟑𝑪𝑨𝑷𝑰𝑻𝑨𝑳𝒊𝒕−𝟏  +  𝜷𝟒%𝑪𝑯𝑨𝑵𝑮𝑬𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟓𝑭𝑰𝑹𝒊𝒕−𝟏 
𝜷𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟕𝑪𝑨𝑻𝑨𝑳𝑼𝑵𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟖𝑴𝑨𝑫𝑹𝑰𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟗𝑩𝑨𝑳𝑬𝑨𝑹𝑬𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎𝑮𝑨𝑳𝑰𝑪𝑰𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑿𝑻𝑹𝑬𝑴𝑨𝑫𝑼𝑹𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕−𝟏 (3) 
                                                 
2 Odds ratio = p/(1-p), where p is the probability of failure.  
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 Since most caja failures occurred between 2008 and 2010, the years of the crisis, a dummy 
variable (CRISIS) was created to test the impact of the crisis on failure. CRISIS is equal to one if the 
year is equal to 2008, 2009, or 2010. The following models were created to test the probability of 
caja failure: 
𝑭𝑨𝑰𝑳𝑼𝑹𝑬𝒊𝒕 =  𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑮𝑬𝑶𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑪𝑼𝑳𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑬𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟑𝑪𝑨𝑷𝑰𝑻𝑨𝑳𝒊𝒕−𝟏  +  𝜷𝟒%𝑪𝑯𝑨𝑵𝑮𝑬𝒊𝒕−𝟏 +  𝜷𝟓𝑭𝑰𝑹𝒊𝒕−𝟏 
𝜷𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟕𝑪𝑨𝑻𝑨𝑳𝑼𝑵𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟖𝑴𝑨𝑫𝑹𝑰𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟗𝑩𝑨𝑳𝑬𝑨𝑹𝑬𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎𝑮𝑨𝑳𝑰𝑪𝑰𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑿𝑻𝑹𝑬𝑴𝑨𝑫𝑼𝑹𝑨𝒊𝒕 +
𝜷𝟏𝟐𝑪𝑹𝑰𝑺𝑰𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕−𝟏 (4) 
The geographic variables were removed because cajas in other regions had also failed and the 
previous model did not indicate that having a headquarters in one of these regions was significant. 
𝑭𝑨𝑰𝑳𝑼𝑹𝑬𝒊 =  𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑮𝑬𝑶𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑪𝑼𝑳𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑬𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟑𝑪𝑨𝑷𝑰𝑻𝑨𝑳𝒊𝒕−𝟏  +  𝜷𝟒%𝑪𝑯𝑨𝑵𝑮𝑬𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟓𝑭𝑰𝑹𝒊𝒕−𝟏 
𝜷𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟕𝑪𝑹𝑰𝑺𝑰𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕−𝟏 (5) 
We also estimated the model with dummy variables for each year in the sample. The following 
model was estimated; however the maximum likelihood estimate may not exist: 
𝑭𝑨𝑰𝑳𝑼𝑹𝑬𝒊 =  𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑮𝑬𝑶𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑪𝑼𝑳𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑬𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟑𝑪𝑨𝑷𝑰𝑻𝑨𝑳𝒊𝒕−𝟏  +  𝜷𝟒%𝑪𝑯𝑨𝑵𝑮𝑬𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟓𝑭𝑰𝑹𝒊𝒕−𝟏 
𝜷𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏 +  𝜷𝟕𝑪𝑨𝑻𝑨𝑳𝑼𝑵𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟖𝑴𝑨𝑫𝑹𝑰𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟗𝑩𝑨𝑳𝑬𝑨𝑹𝑬𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎𝑮𝑨𝑳𝑰𝑪𝑰𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑿𝑻𝑹𝑬𝑴𝑨𝑫𝑼𝑹𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 
𝜷𝟏𝟐𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟒𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟑𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟓𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟒𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟔𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟓𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟔𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖 + 𝜷𝟏𝟕𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟗𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟖𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟗𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟏𝒊 + 𝜷𝟐𝟎𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟐𝒊  + 𝜺𝒊𝒕−𝟏 
(6) 
 Lastly, we estimated Model 3 on data from the crisis years 2008-2010:  
𝑭𝑨𝑰𝑳𝑼𝑹𝑬𝒊 =  𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑮𝑬𝑶𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑪𝑼𝑳𝑻𝑼𝑹𝑬𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟑𝑪𝑨𝑷𝑰𝑻𝑨𝑳𝒊𝒕−𝟏  +  𝜷𝟒%𝑪𝑯𝑨𝑵𝑮𝑬𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟓𝑭𝑰𝑹𝒊𝒕−𝟏 
𝜷𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟕𝑪𝑨𝑻𝑨𝑳𝑼𝑵𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟖𝑴𝑨𝑫𝑹𝑰𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟗𝑩𝑨𝑳𝑬𝑨𝑹𝑬𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎𝑮𝑨𝑳𝑰𝑪𝑰𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑬𝑿𝑻𝑹𝑬𝑴𝑨𝑫𝑼𝑹𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕−𝟏 (7) 
6. Empirical Results 
 Recall the two major hypotheses of the paper: increased geographic diversification is 
associated with a higher probability of failure and a higher level of cultural differences between a 
caja and its branches lead to a higher probability of failure. In two of the eight models tested, the 
hypothesis was rejected since higher geographic diversification (GEODIST) was associated with 
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a reduction in the probability of caja failure. In Model 1, the model that excludes the cultural 
diversification variable (CULTURE), an increase in geographic diversification by one kilometer 
is associated with a very small, 0.05%, change in the odds ratio (10% level of significance). 
Lastly, in Model 6, the model that includes GEODIST, CULTURE, and the annual dummy 
variables, a one kilometer increase in geographic diversification is associated with a 0.011% 
decrease in the odds ratio at the 10% level of significance (Table 4). Although the change 
appears small for one kilometer, increasing the distance by 100 kilometers reduces the odds ratio 
by 5%. Model 6, however may not present accurate results because the maximum likelihood 
estimate may not exist. One possible reason for the lack of validity may be the large number of 
variables included in the model. The two models described above indicate that geographic 
expansion had negative impact on the odds of caja failure. These results contact with those 
above, Gutiérrez et al. (2011) who found that 59.4% of the branches that closed during the crisis 
were located in areas where territorial expansion occurred. One driver behind the difference may 
be that Gutiérrez considered individual branches while our model focuses on the entire caja. 
Another difference may be that geographic expansion helped but branches in the furthest regions 
were first to close in the crisis. Furthermore, geographic diversification may lower risk of caja 
failure because the caja is protected from idiosyncratic and local market risk. The coefficients of 
GEODIST are not statistically significant in any other models.   
Cultural differences impact caja failure in one of the models tested. As with increasing 
geographic diversification, increasing cultural differences is associated with a lower odds ratio in 
that model. The odds ratio decreases by 0.872%, at the 5% level of significance, in response to a 
one percentage point increase in this measure of culture diversification in Model 3, which 
includes CULTURE but excludes GEODIST.  The coefficients on CULTURE in all other 
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models are insignificant. Low or even negative correlations in asset returns between regions may 
explain this result. Moreover, moving to “diverse” provinces may not provide large changes in 
language since the national language in the country is Castilian Spanish and many businesses 
operate using the official language.   
 Both GEODIST and CULTURE are significant when the association between these 
variables and failure is tested separately. However, in those models where GEODIST and 
CULTURE are both present, neither variable is significant. After testing the correlation of these 
two explanatory variables, there is evidence of positive correlation (0.76509) between GEODIST 
and CULTURE. As a result of both GEODIST and CULTURE being constructed, in part, using 
the ratio of branches to total branches, this correlation most likely exists.   
Throughout the models, there are several patterns in the control variables. As expected, 
increased capital as a percentage of total assets is associated with a decrease in the probability of 
failure in Models 1, 2, and 3. That is, for every 1 percentage point increase in the capital ratio, 
the odds ratio decreases by 0.22%, 0.251%, and 0.249%, respectively. The coefficients for 
CAPITAL in all other models are insignificant. Moreover, increasing the total assets by 1% from 
one year to the next reduces the odds ratio by 0.043% or more from Models 1-5 and 7 (Table 3, 
and Table 5). This result is unexpected and may occur because the strongest cajas grew quickly 
while weaker cajas did not expand as rapidly. Lastly, being headquartered in Galicia is 
significant in Model 6, although the validity of this model is questionable because of the large 
number of variables estimated (degrees of freedom is equal to 21) (Table 4). A caja 
headquartered in this region has 111% greater odds of failure relative to the base case (every 
region apart from those included as dummy variables). During the housing boom, Galicia 
experienced a 232% increase in housing prices. When the market collapsed, this region likely 
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saw large drops in housing prices, leaving individuals with large debt and little equity. Moreover, 
two of the three of the cajas located in Galicia failed during the crisis which may artificially 
increase the significance of the coefficient. The remaining control variables (ROA and other 
regional variables) were not significant in any model.  
 The crisis strained the economy and financial sector in Spain. As a result, most cajas that 
experienced failure did so between 2008 and 2010. In the initial models, including the non-crisis 
years may dampen the significance of the coefficients. However, narrowing the data set to look 
specifically at the crisis years (2008-2010), neither GEODIST nor CULTURE is significant 
which is broadly consistent with results of the other models. These results also contradict our two 
hypotheses. Two variables are significant in the model: %CHANGE and FIR. %CHANGE is 
significant at the 10% level in Model 7, increasing total assets by 1% from one year to the next 
results in a 0.042% decrease in the odds ratio (Table 5).  FIR is significant at the 5% level. For 
every 1% increase in the fixed income ratio, the odds ratio increases by 24.9% (Table 5). Theory 
dictates that an increase in fixed income to total assets will reduce failure since it will provide a 
buffer from fire-sales during high withdrawal periods. One explanation of the increase in failure 
in this model may be that cajas reduced asset levels overall including cash levels to try and 
prevent failure. Therefore, the ratio increased as a result of a smaller total asset level, not 
increasing fixed income.  
 Overall, the models indicate that both geographic diversification and cultural differences 
either decrease or have no effect on the likelihood of caja failure. Therefore, cajas should 
continue expanding into new regions. The results also suggest that cajas focus on increasing 
their total assets from year to year in order to further prevent failure while increasing their 
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shareholder’s equity ratio. Lastly, it appears that cajas in regions outside of Galicia were less 
likely to fail.  
7. Conclusion 
 Cajas de ahorros expanded into new geographic and cultural regions following the 
collapse of the Franco regime in 1975. Spain’s economy boomed, particularly when the nation 
joined the EU in 1999. But a property bubble emerged in 2006, and household debt swelled to 
120% of disposable income. By the end of 2008, the Spanish central bank declared a recession. 
Cajas experienced large defaults during this financial crisis that lasted from 2008 till 2011. 
Numerous cajas failed resulting in either complete operational closure or emergency mergers.  
 Many cajas underwent a significant shift toward geographic diversification in the years 
before the crisis. Much debate in the academic literature surrounds the impact of geographic 
diversification. Several studies have indicated that geographic diversification lowers risk by 
reducing the volatility of earnings and protecting against idiosyncratic and local market risk 
through imperfect correlations in asset returns among regions (Markowitz 1959, Emmons et al. 
2004, Berger et al. 2001). However, others have found that geographic diversification increases 
risk when, perhaps encouraged by regulators, banks diversify beyond optimal levels (Hayden et 
al. 2007, Wagner 2010, Emmons et al. 2004). As a result of this debate, this paper studied the 
geographic diversification of cajas and its association with caja failure. Our evidence supports 
the argument that geographic diversification either has no effect on or reduces risk as measured 
by the odds of failure. A factor related to geographic diversification is cultural diversification. 
Cultural diversification can increase risk for banks if language, culture, or regulatory structures 
significantly vary between states or provinces. These differences will reduce efficiencies 
throughout the bank (Berger and de Young 2001). We also analyzed the impact of cultural 
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difference on likelihood of failure, hypothesizing that greater cultural diversification resulted in a 
higher probability of failure. Results indicated that increasing cultural diversification reduces the 
odds of failure. The prominence of a national culture and the use of an official language may 
result in the reduction of the culture differences between Spanish regions. Thus, both our 
hypotheses were rejected. 
The evidence presented here implies that policy makers should not restrict geographic 
and cultural diversification. We suggest that future research focuses on gathering improved data, 
especially for Spanish cajas. Researchers should also investigate the association between 
geographic and cultural factors and caja profitability since ROA was not significant in any of the 
models. Moreover, researchers should examine failures during crises in other countries as a 
means to better understand the geographic diversification debate. Lastly, an examination of 
international banking overall would be of interest because banks operating in more than one 
country may present more compelling evidence on the impact of cultural and geographic 
diversification on risk levels and bank failure.    
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Table 1: Summary statistics  
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
GEODIST 436 104.03 105.96 0 625.11 
CULTURE 436 0.396 0.261 0 1 
RETEARN 436 897,984 1,481,064 -3,075,618 11,298,000 
CASH 436 407,184 971,574 0 11,791,586 
LOANS 436 16,572,286 28,815,608 8795 228,925,369 
TOTALASSET 436 23,621,830 42,447,483 81,764 335,675,311 
LIABILITY 436 22,256,368 40,668,177 9,024 314,531,836 
EQUITY 436 1,361,726 2,268,144 -6,187,818 21,143,475 
NETINCOME 419 121,401 288,866 -1,139,862 3,382,481 
FIXEDINCOME 436 509,182 1,141,766 0 6,673,316 
ROA 376 0.67 0.75 -7.45 8.61 
CAPITAL 379 8.21 7.88 -6.37 104.14 
%CHANGE 379 19.81 94.97 -96.70 1370.53 
FIR 379 2.46 3.64 0 35.49 
GEODIST represents weighted average distance between a caja and its branches. CULTURE is the ratio of 
branches outside the caja headquarters to total branches. RETEARN represents a caja's retained earnings. 
CASH is the cash and cash equivalents on a caja's balance sheet. TOTALASSET is the sum of all assets on 
the balance sheet. LIABILITY represents both short and long-term liabilities on a caja's balance sheet. 
EQUITY is the shareholder's equity level from the balance sheet. NETINCOME represents a caja's total 
earnings. FIXEDINCOME represents the level of fixed income securities held by a caja. ROA measures 
return on assets. CAPITAL is the shareholder equity ratio. %CHANGE represents change in total assets 
from one year to the next. FIR is the ratio of fixed income to total assets.   
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Table 2: Regression results for Models 1-3.   
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio 
INTERCEPT 0.1513 - 0.727 - 0.6979 - 
  (0.0494)   (0.8608)   (0.7691)   
GEODIST -0.00487* 0.995 - - -0.00078 0.999 
  (3.3719)       (0.0445)   
CULTURE -   -2.0752** 0.126 -1.8495 0.157 
      (5.2605)   (1.7631)   
CAPITAL -0.2508** 0.778 -0.2893*** 0.749 -0.2867*** 0.751 
  (5.8946)   (7.1518)   (6.9374)   
%CHANGE -0.0456*** 0.955 -0.0429*** 0.958 -0.434*** 0.957 
  (11.0871)   (10.0048)   (9.9124)   
FIR -0.00921 0.991 0.0135 1.014 0.011 1.011 
  (0.0203)   (0.0436)   (0.0279)   
ROA 0.2936 1.341 0.2844 1.329 0.2876 1.333 
  (0.9905)   (0.9304)   (0.9483)   
MADRID 0.5996 1.821 0.3303 1.35 0.3671 1.444 
  (0.2625)   (0.0710)   (0.0983)   
CATALUNA -0.0482 0.953 -0.2634 0.768 -0.2431 0.784 
  (0.0102)   (0.2862)   (0.2351)   
GALICIA 0.8869 2.428 0.6926 1.999 0.7487 2.114 
  (0.9518)   (0.6099)   (0.6570)   
BALEARES -1.2259 0.293 -1.6243 0.197 -1.6008 0.202 
  (1.2368)   (2.0880)   (2.0039)   
EXTREMADURA 0.4214 1.524 0.4275 1.533 0.4224 1.526 
  (0.2614)   (0.2695)   (0.2629)   
CASTILLA 0.0415 1.042 0.1776 1.194 0.158 1.171 
  (0.0048)   (0.0859)   (0.0665)   
# of Observations 376 376 376 
Likelihood 211.791 210.117 210.07 
Likelihood Ratio 34.4249 36.0988 36.145 
*, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.                                                                                       
These models present logit model results. All variables are lagged one year except the region and time dummies.  Refer to 
Table 1 for variable details. 
  
P a g e  | 33 
 
 
 
Table 3: Regression results for Models 4 and 5 
  Model 4 Model 5 
Variable Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio 
INTERCEPT -2.6073** - -2.732*** - 
  (5.7406)   (8.8177)   
GEODIST 0.000003206 1 0.000655 1.001 
  (0)   (0.0378)   
CULTURE -1.8279 0.161 -1.4464 0.235 
  (1.3416)   (1.1925)   
CAPITAL -0.0825 0.921 -0.0907 0.913 
  (0.5549)   (0.8566)   
%CHANGE -0.0326** 0.968 -0.0307** 0.97 
  (6.0758)   (6.1946)   
FIR 0.0948 1.099 0.0979 1.103 
  (1.8373)   (2.0314)   
ROA -0.0813 0.922 -0.0193 0.981 
  (0.0483)   (0.0027)   
MADRID 0.5053 1.658 - - 
  (0.1665)       
CATALUNA 0.1131 1.12 - - 
  (0.0420)       
GALICIA 1.1779 3.248 - - 
  (1.3838)       
BALEARES -1.1671 0.311 - - 
  (0.9680)       
EXTREMADURA 0.2351 1.265 - - 
  (0.0695)       
CASTILLA 0.0231 1.023 - - 
  (0.0014)       
CRISIS 2.7422 15.522 2.7177*** 15.146 
  (23.6913)   (24.2949)   
# of Observations 376 376 
Likelihood 176.711 179.497 
Likelihood Ratio 69.5049 66.7188 
*, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.                                                                                       
These models present logit model results. All variables are lagged one year except the region 
and time dummies.  Refer to Table 1 for variable details. 
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Table 4: Regression results for Model 6 
  Model 6 
Variable Coefficient Odds Ratio 
INTERCEPT -15.467 - 
  (0.0043)   
GEODIST -0.0108* 0.989 
  (3.4737)   
CULTURE 0.1275 1.136 
  (0.0034)   
CAPITAL -0.0751 0.928 
  (0.2605)   
%CHANGE -0.0102 0.99 
  (0.4405)   
FIR -0.0272 0.973 
  (0.0743)   
ROA 1.0468 2.848 
  (1.6378)   
MADRID 1.3687 3.93 
  (0.5977)   
CATALUNA 1.2925 3.642 
  (2.6268)   
GALICIA 4.7136*** 111.456 
  (8.4178)   
BALEARES -2.0557 0.128 
  (2.1056)   
EXTREMADURA 0.0458 1.047 
  (0.0014)   
CASTILLA -0.0109 0.989 
  (0.0002)   
# of Observations 376 
Likelihood 97.906 
Likelihood Ratio 148.3092 
*, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level respectively.                                                                                       
These models present logit model results. All variables 
are lagged one year except the region and time dummies.  
Refer to Table 1 for variable details. 
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Model 6 Continued  
Variable Coefficient Odds Ratio 
2004 -0.623 0.94 
  (0)   
2005 0.0564 1.058 
  (0)   
2006 11.419 >999 
  (0.0024)   
2007 0.2306 1.259 
  (0)   
2008 0.1852 1.203 
  (0)   
2009 14.7739 >999 
  (0.0040)   
2010 17.4996 >999 
  (0.0056)   
2011 16.0862 >999 
  (0.0047)   
2012 2.563 12.974 
  (0)   
# of Observations 376 
Likelihood 97.906 
Likelihood Ratio 148.3092 
*, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level respectively.                                                                                       
These models present logit model results. All variables are 
lagged one year except the region and time dummies.  
Refer to Table 1 for variable details. 
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Table 5: Regression results for Model 7 
  Model 7 
Variable Coefficient Odds Ratio 
INTERCEPT 0.2316 - 
  (0.0459)   
GEODIST 0.000217 1 
  (0.0019)   
CULTURE -2.1677 0.114 
  (1.2101)   
CAPITAL -0.01733 0.841 
  (1.3951)   
%CHANGE -0.0432* 0.958 
  (2.8617)   
FIR 0.2221** 1.249 
  (5.5162)   
ROA 0.3062 1.358 
  (0.3222)   
MADRID 1.0395 2.828 
  (0.6021)   
CATALUNA 0.1969 1.218 
  (0.0919)   
GALICIA 1.9184 6.81 
  (2.4997)   
BALEARES -0.8856 0.412 
  (0.4704)   
EXTREMADURA 0.6392 1.895 
  (0.4262)   
CASTILLA 0.6443 1.905 
  (0.8441)   
# of Observations 123 
Likelihood 122.556 
Likelihood Ratio 20.5057 
*, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level respectively.                                                                                       
These models present logit model results. All variables are 
lagged one year except the region and time dummies.  Refer 
to Table 1 for variable details. 
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Appendix A: Haversine Formula 
The Haversine formula employs location coordinates to measure distance between two 
locations given the spherical nature of the Earth. The formula below was used to calculate 
distance between each caja’s headquarters and its branches. These distance measures were used 
to estimate the weighted average distance that represents geographic diversification (Sinnott, 
1984).  
Haversine Formula  
a = sin²(Δφ/2) + cos(φ1).cos(φ2).sin²(Δλ/2) 
c = 2.atan2(√a, √(1−a)) 
d = R.c 
Where φ is latitude, λ is longitude, R is earth’s radius (mean radius = 6,371km). 
 
 
 
 
